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COMPARING THE 1993 U.S AIRSTRIKE ON IRAQ TO THE 1986
BOMBING OF LIBYA: THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51
I. INTRODUCTION
During the night of June 27, 1993, twenty-three streaks of light skimmed
the desert sands of Iraq, rapidly converging on a location in southwest
Baghdad. The flight of United States Tomahawk cruise missiles, each
carrying almost 1,000 pounds of explosives, raced by the Baghdad skyline
searching for the designated target: the command and control complex of
the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The night was filled with deafening explo-
sions as the missiles struck the grounds of the intelligence complex, sending
plumes of flame into the night sky. When the explosions ceased and the din
faded, the intelligence complex had been devastated and eight Iraqi civilians
were dead.'
In stark contrast to all of the noise and tumult which characterized the
immediate consequences of the United States airstrike on Iraq, the voice of
the world community in questioning the legality of the attack has been
markedly quiet, if not entirely inaudible. The majority of states have
expressed no objections to the airstrike and seem to have largely accepted
the legal justification provided by the United States.' According to the
United States' ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline K. Albright, the
attack was prompted by an Iraqi assassination attempt on former-President
George Bush.3 Furthermore, she stated that the attack was authorized by
' Eric Schmitt, Raid on Baghdad: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, at Al;
James Collins, Striking Back, TIME, July 5, 1993, at 20. For a more detailed description of
the events surrounding the airstrike on the Iraqi Intelligence Service, see infra text
accompanying notes 13-26. See generally U.S. Missile Attack Targets Iraqi Intelligence
Agency; Baghdad Raid Retaliates for Bush 'Death Plot', 1993 FAcTS ON FILE 481
[hereinafter U.S. Missile Attack] (summarizing the events immediately preceding the airstrike
and the international community's reaction).
2 See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
' Richard Bernstein, Raid on Baghdad: The United Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993,
at A7.
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which specifically permits the use
of force in self-defense.
The most remarkable aspect of the international community's quiet
acceptance of the United States' reliance on Article 51 for justifying the
airstrike is not simply that so many states acquiesced to the United States'
actions. Iraq is certainly no favorite of the world community, especially
after its recent aggression against Kuwait leading to the costly Persian Gulf
War,5 its attempted genocide against the Kurds,6 and its deliberate efforts
to thwart attempts by U.N. inspectors to enforce U.N. Security Council
resolutions.' Rather, the truly remarkable aspect of the general world-wide
acceptance of the legality of the airstrike only becomes clear after
4 Id Article 51 gives a state a temporally limited right to self-defense in response to an
"armed attack"by another state. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. It further requires that such actions
must be immediately reported to the Security Council. Id. For the text of Article 51, see text
accompanying note 47.
5 On August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq invaded Kuwait, its neighbor to the
southeast, and occupied the nation until expelled by Allied forces led by the United States in
February of 1991. The U.N. Security Council strongly condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
as a "breach of international peace and security." S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2932d Mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990); reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
6 Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, the government of Iraq has conducted a
campaign of genocide against the four million Kurdish people of northern Iraq. Evidence
collected by human rights agencies indicates that hundreds of thousands of Kurds have
already been killed by mass executions, torture, chemical attacks, Iraqi land mines, and
random killings. In addition, some 4,000 Kurdish villages and hamlets have been
systematically destroyed by Iraqi forces. The amount of evidence collected to date is so
compelling that researchers intend to bring an action in the International Court of Justice
against Iraq for the crime of genocide. Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, Section 6 (Magazine), at 12.
'After its defeat in the Persian Gulf War, Iraq agreed to grant U.N. inspectors reasonable
access to facilities in Iraq which were suspected of being used for the production of nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons. On numerous occasions, however, Iraq refused to adhere to
its obligations under the cease-fire agreements and denied U.N. inspectors access to several
facilities. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Iraq Again Refuses to Let a U.N. Team Close Missile Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1993, at Al; Iraq Thwarts U.N. Arms Inspection, 1993 FACTS ON FILE
513, 515-516.
' There are a few exceptions to this general approval. In addition to Iraq, several other
states have condemned the U.S. action, including China, Bangladesh, Yemen, Iran, and Sudan.
Paul Holmes, Concern in China, Misgivings in Europe, Reuter Libr. Rep., June 28, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuter North American News File; Adamishin Defends
Foreign Ministry Statement on US Bombing Of Iraq, BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts,
July 3, 1993, at Su/1731/C2, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
ARTICLE 51
comparing it to the reaction of the international community following a
relatively recent and extremely similar use of U.S. military force: the 1986
airstrike against Libya.
In April 1986, when the United States armed forces conducted a bombing
raid against targets in Libya9 under circumstances very similar to those of
the 1993 Iraq strike,10 the world community responded with almost
unanimous condemnation and disapproval.1 Moreover, the international
community resoundingly rejected the United States' reliance on Article 51
as legal authority for the Libya raid 2 -the same authority which has been
widely accepted by the world community following the 1993 Iraq raid.
An important change has taken place in the legal interpretation of Article
51: a broadened construction which sets a crucial precedent in international
law. This Note analyzes the apparent shift in the interpretation of Article 51
as exemplified by the different responses of the international community to
the 1986 Libya raid and the 1993 Iraq strike, and examines the significance
of this shift to the future of international law.
II. FACrUAL BACKGROUND
A. The 1993 Airstrike on Iraq
Proclaimed as a hero by the Kuwaiti people for liberating their nation,
former-President Bush was invited by the Kuwaiti government to visit
Kuwait and attend a special ceremony in Kuwait City in appreciation of his
leadership during the Persian Gulf War. 3 On April 14, as Mr. Bush was
beginning his three-day visit to Kuwait, Kuwaiti authorities arrested fourteen
men for smuggling plastic explosives into Kuwait and subsequently
uncovered evidence that the explosives were intended to be used to
' For a more detailed description of the 1986 bombing raid on Libya, see infra notes 27-
42 and accompanying text. See generally U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets; Reagan Cites 'Self-
Defense' Against Terrorism, Vows Further Raids if Needed, 1986 FACTS ON FILE 257
[hereinafter U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets] (summarizing the 1986 U.S. bombing raid of
Libya).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 63-66.
" See infra notes 32-42.
12 See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
'" Robert Marshall, "Don't Tread on Us", MACLEAN's, July 5, 1993, at 16.
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assassinate the former President. 14
Convinced by evidence presented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Iraqi government
had orchestrated the plot, 5 President Bill Clinton ordered an airstrike
against Iraq. 6 On June 26, 1993, United States naval forces launched the
attack against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters." The twenty-three
Tomahawk cruise missiles largely succeeded in destroying most of the
intelligence compound,' although three missiles missed their targets and
'4 During the night of April 12, 1993, the suspects in the plot against former-President
Bush smuggled approximately 80 kilograms of explosives, hidden within the frame of a
Toyota Land Cruiser, into Kuwait. White House Background Briefing on Action Against Iraq,
U.S. NEWSWiRE, June 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter
White House Briefing]. The car bomb could be detonated either by manual remote control
or by timer, and had the power to "kill people within a radius of 400 yards." Id.
On June 4, 1994, after a year-long trial, a Kuwaiti court sentenced five Iraqis and one
Kuwaiti to death by hanging for their involvement in the assassination plot. Seven other Iraqi
and Kuwaiti conspirators received prison sentences ranging from six months to 12 years, and
one Kuwaiti was acquitted. Six Condemned in Bush Death Try, 1994 FACTS ON FILE 466,
466.
1S Both the FBI and the CIA conducted investigations, which confirmed that the strike
team had smuggled the large car bomb into Kuwait in order to assassinate former-President
Bush. Id. According to a senior Administration official, two of the main suspects, Ra'ad al-
Asadi and Wall al-Ghazali, "told the FBI that they had been recruited and received orders in
Basra, Iraq, from individuals they believed to be associated with the Iraqi Intelligence
Service," and al-Ghazali "told the FBI that he was recruited for the specific purpose of
assassinating President Bush in Kuwait City." Id.
FBI forensic experts further linked the assassination plot to Iraq after examining the
components of the bomb, certain aspects of which had been found "only in devices linked to
Iraq and not in devices used by any other terrorist group." Id The experts also concluded
that other explosives seized in the plot included components built by the same person or
persons who had built similar devices previously recovered from Iraq. Id.
16 Text of a Letter from President Clinton to Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, in THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT, June 28,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File [hereinafter Letter to Speaker of the
House].
17 The Iraqi Intelligence Service's central command and control complex was selected as
the target of the attack because of its apparent close involvement with planning and equipping
the assassination strike team. Id. See White House Briefing, supra note 14.
" Letter to Speaker of the House, supra note 16; America v. Islam, ECONOMIST, July 3,
1993, at 39.
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ARnCLE 51
exploded in a nearby residential neighborhood, killing eight Iraqi citizens.'
The international community responded to the airstrike with general
approval. The members of the United Nations reacted mildly when informed
of the strike at a special meeting convened by the United States on June 27,
1993.20 Britain" and Israel22 expressed staunch support for the action,
while Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea voiced unanimous if
somewhat more subdued support.23 China was the only permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council which questioned the legality of the attack,'
although France expressed certain reservations.25 All other members of the
Council voiced their approval of the attack-including all three of the
19 U.S. Missile Attack, supra note 1, at 481. The civilians who were killed included two
children and a prominent Iraqi painter, Layla al-Attar, who ran the state art gallery. America
v. Islam, supra note 18, at 39.
o The United States called a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council on
June 27, 1993, in order to notify the Security Council of the airstrike, in compliance with
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which requires such notification. The United States'
Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, reported the preliminary results of the
airstrike and presented the Security Council with the evidence linking Iraq to the attempted
assassination of former-President Bush. Stanley Meisler, U.N. Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains
Raid, L.A. T0MES, June 28, 1993, at Al. Albright further stated that the airstrike was in
accordance with international law, relying on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Julia Preston,
Security Council Reaction Largely Favorable to U.S. Raid, WASH. POST, June 28, 1993, at
A12. For the text of Albright's presentation, see Albright Addresses U.N. Security Council,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File [hereinafter Albright].
21 Prime Minister John Major's office issued a statement declaring that state terrorism
"must be met with an unambiguous response and must be deterred by all proper and
legitimate means .... We regard the American response as entirely justified." Marshall,
supra note 13, at 16. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated, "[t]his operation was
a justified and proportionate exercise of the right of self-defense and a necessary warning to
Iraq that state terrorism cannot and will not be tolerated." Holmes, supra note 8.
22 Martin Walker, Clinton Hails Strike as Success; Six Dead as Missiles Miss Iraqi
Target, GUARDIAN, June 28, 1993, at 1.
2 Holmes, supra note 8.
2 Id. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing its concern about the
attack: "We are opposed to any act that contravenes the U.N. [C]harter and norms governing
international relations. Nor are we in favor of any action, including use of force, that may
aggravate tension in the region." Id.
' France stated that it did not seek "either the destabilization or the dismemberment of
the Iraqi state." U.S. Missile Attack, supra note 1, at 481.
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Islamic member nations on the Security Council.2
B. The 1986 Bombing of Libya
The events leading to the raid on Libya are remarkably similar to those
preceding the airstrike on Iraq. Libyan President Mu'ammar Qaddafi had
lost the support of most states by supporting a series of terrorist attacks
against Western European civilians.' These attacks included the bombing
of a West Berlin nightclub on April 5, 1986, which killed a U.S. serviceman
and a Turkish national and injured about 200 others, including more than
sixty U.S. soldiers and their dependents.2" U.S. intelligence agencies
conclusively linked the bombing in Berlin to the Libyan government,
discovering evidence that the terrorists involved in the incident had been
organized and supported by Libya.29 Learning of this connection, President
Ronald Reagan ordered a bombing raid on April 14, 1986, against military
and paramilitary targets in Libya, including airfields, intelligence facilities,
and terrorist training camps." The raid inflicted serious damage to Libya's
military infrastructure, and an unknown number of Libyan civilians were
26 The three Islamic members of the security council are Pakistan, Djibouti and Morocco.
Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 28, 1993, at
1. Other Moslem nations, including Egypt, Jordan and Iran, criticized the airstrike for
injuring civilians. U.S. Missile Attack, supra note 1, at 481. Of the Arab countries, only
Kuwait supported the raid. Id.
27 The most egregious of these terrorist acts were the massacres at the Rome and Vienna
airports, and the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and subsequent murder of Leon
Klinghoffer, an elderly American confined to a wheelchair. For a review of Libyan sponsored
terrorist activities, see David Turndorf, Note, The U.S. Raid On Libya: A Forceful Response
to Terrorism, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 187, 187 n.3-4, 190-92 (1988).
28 U.S. Presses Allies on Libya And Weighs Military Action; West Berlin Disco Bombing
Kills 2, 1986 FACTS ON FiLE 243, 243 [hereinafter U.S. Presses Allies on Libya]. Another
American later died from injuries caused by the bomb explosion; thus, two Americans were
killed by the terrorist attack. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An
International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 185 n.77 (1987).
29 U.S. intelligence agencies intercepted instructions from Tripoli to Libya's East Berlin
embassy ordering attacks on "American targets," and later congratulations for the successful
bombing of the East Berlin discotheque. Kiki Bhatia, The Reluctant Cowboy, HERITAGE
FoUND. POL. REV., Fall 1988, No. 46 at 55.
30 Turndorf, supra note 27, at 1 n. 1.
ARTICLE 51
killed.31
The reaction of the international community was singularly disapproving.
Of the United States' traditional allies, only Britain,32 Israel,33 and South
Africa' 4 actively supported the raid. Canada offered only qualified support
for the raid.35 Significantly, almost all other states, including some of the
United States' allies,3' expressed grave concerns over the legality of the
raid. The Soviet Union deplored the raid and canceled a pre-summit meeting
with the United States in protest.3 China called it an "encroachment upon
the territory of a sovereign state under the pretext of striking terrorism.
38
3' Estimates range from 45 to over 100 killed. Ivan Zverina, U.S., Britain, France Veto
U.N. Condemnation of Raid on Libya, UPI, Apr. 21, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
32 Britain supported the raid by allowing the United States to launch the raid from British
air bases. Andrew H. Malcolm, While Across the Atlantic, Anglophilia Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1986, at A4. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher strongly defended her
decision to aid the United States, explaining, "It was inconceivable to me that we should
refuse U.S. aircraft and U.S. pilots to be able to defend their own people .... If one always
refused to take any risks because of the consequences, then the terrorist governments will win
and one can only cringe before them." U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 9, at 260.
3' Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres applauded the U.S. raid, stating that "[tihe
American action benefitted the whole free world, which was becoming more and more a
victim of irresponsible terrorism. It is good that a major power like the United States took
steps to cut off the arm of the terrorists, at least one of them." Israelis Praise It While Arabs
Vow to Avenge It, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1986, at A9 [hereinafter Israelis Praise].
34 U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 9, at 260.
35 Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated that he agreed with the objectives of
the raid, but deplored the killing of innocent civilians. Id.
' U.S. allies who objected to the raid include Greece, Holland, France, West Germany,
Belgium, Spain and Italy. Bhatia, supra note 29, at 55-56. France obstinately refused to
grant the U.S. aircraft permission to enter its airspace, forcing the pilots to fly a course more
than twice the length than would have otherwise been necessary. Id. at 258, 260. The United
States did not ask Spain for overflight permission, "probably because the Spanish govern-
ment's answer was already no," according to Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. Id.
at 260. West Germany and Italy tempered their disapproval of the raid by also condemning
Libya's actions that had precipitated the crisis. Id.
37 A Kremlin statement attacked the raid as "a new criminal action fraught with a serious
threat to universal peace and security. Id. Soviet foreign ministry spokesperson Vladimir B.
Lomeiko asserted that the United States had "shown contempt for international law and
morality." Id.
m Israelis Praise, supra note 33, at A9.
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The Third World nations uniformly condemned the raid.39
In the United Nations, the overwhelming majority of states objected to the
raid. U.N. General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar issued a statement
declaring that ".... [the Secretary General] deplores last night's military
action by one member state against another ... ."0 The General Assembly
of the United Nations issued a resolution supported by seventy-eight
members who condemned the attack.4' Furthermore, the Security Council
attempted to issue its own resolution condemning "the armed attack by the
United States of America in violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and the norms of international conduct." '42 President Reagan's reliance on
Article 51 as authorization for the airstrike had clearly been rejected.
m. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
Article 51 originated with the ratification of the U.N. Charter in 1945.
Having witnessed the horrors and brutality of the Second World War, the
drafters of the Charter wrote the document "[t]o maintain international peace
and security."' The guiding principle behind the Charter is that interna-
tional aggression should be avoided whenever possible and condemned as a
violation of international law." This prohibition against warfare is
" Intoccia, supra note 28, at 189. Saudi Arabia stated that the raid violated "all
international norms." Israelis Praise, supra note 33, at A9. Kuwait called the raid an "act
of terrorism." Id. Egypt, a traditional enemy of Libya, expressed "alarm and strong
resentment." Id. Jordan, which severed diplomatic relations with Libya in 1984, called the
raid "a grave act," adding that "the results would be graver." Id. India objected that the
airstrike was in total disregard of international law and a clear act of aggression. Id. Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi lambasted the United States, calling the raid a "dastardly, blatant
and unprovoked act of aggression" and offered India's "firm support and solidarity to Libya
in this critical hour." U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 9, at 260.
' Israelis Praise, supra note 33, at A9.
41 Michael J. Berlin, Raid on Libya Condemned by U.N. General Assembly, WASH. POST,
Nov. 21, 1986, at A30.
42 Zverina, supra note 31. The nine countries supporting the resolution were: Bulgaria,
China, Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, the Soviet Union, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and the
United Arab Emirates. Id. Australia, Denmark, and France joined Britain and the United
States in vetoing the U.N. resolution condemning the raid. Id.
43 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
4 Id art. 1-2.
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presented in Article 2(4):
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
45tions.
Understandably, the U.N. Charter does not permit many exceptions to this
general rule.'
However, one exception to the rule is found in Article 51, which permits
the use of force in self-defense. The wording of this article is important:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Mem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.47
In the context of the present discussion of the raids on Libya and Iraq, the
key phrase in Article 51 is "armed attack." This ambiguous phrase has
created a hotbed of debate in recent years."
The meaning of "armed attack" may have appeared self-explanatory to the
drafters of the U.N. Charter who had just experienced a war which was
heralded by Hitler's massive blitzkrieg assaults into Germany's neighboring
4 Id. art. 2, para. 4.
46 The two exceptions to the prohibition against international military force are: 1) armed
force authorized by the U.N. Security Council [U.N. CHARTER art. 39.1, and 2) force used in
self-defense against an armed attack [U.N. CHARTER art. 51.]. Norman Menachem Feder,
Note, Reading the U.N. Charter Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack,
19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 395, 403 (1987).
47 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
48 See Feder, supra note 46, at 403, 412-18; Intoccia, supra note 28, at 203.
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states. 49 Whether the Nazi invasion of Poland, accomplished by scores of
tanks, planes, and soldiers, constituted an "armed attack" is largely a
rhetorical question.
In recent decades, however, the world has witnessed the rise of a new and
perhaps more sinister form of warfare. This form of international aggression
does not always announce itself with the thunder of tanks and planes, and its
soldiers do not always wear a military uniform. International scholars have
dubbed this new strategy "low-intensity warfare," of which state-sponsored
terrorism is a significant part.' Low-intensity warfare does not readily lend
itself to the international law terms of the U.N. Charter.5' Moreover,
determining the line at which low-intensity warfare becomes an "armed
attack" has been a perplexing task for international legal scholars.52
B. Interpreting Article 51: The Restrictive and Expansive Views
Whether any act of international aggression qualifies as an act which
would trigger the legal use of force in self-defense largely depends upon the
breadth of interpretation given to the phrase "armed attack." Two main
schools of thought have developed in past decades regarding the meaning of
"armed attack": one advocates a restrictive interpretation of the phrase,
49 Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or Changing Norms Governing the Use
of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 812 (1970).
o For an overview of the rise of low-intensity warfare in recent decades, see Alberto R.
Coil, International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy: Present Challenges and Opportunities,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1988, at 107. This new warfare has also been dubbed "violent peace"
by Professor Coil of the U.S. Naval War College. Coil defines violent peace as "a state of
affairs in which a wide spectrum of unconventional and highly creative modes of violence,
best summed under the term 'secret warfare,' are used against an adversary, while maintaining
the pretense that no open war is occurring." hid at 111.
According to Coil, the term "secret warfare," in turn, covers a broad spectrum of illicit
activities, including: "support for guerilla warfare,. . . aid to terrorist groups," and "support
for acts of assassination and political intimidation against foreign leaders .. " Id. at 112
(emphasis added).
"' Id. at 109. As Coil observes, "[tihe traditional rules of international law and the legal
framework of the United Nations Charter, elaborated to deal with outright, open conventional
military aggression, have not been updated authoritatively for the highly creative modes of
violence characteristic of violent peace and secret warfare." lit
52 Feder, supra note 46, at 412.
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while the other argues for an expansive view of the term.53
The restrictive view maintains that "armed attack" should be given a
narrow and literal definition.' Thus, only an actual attack by a large
military force would trigger the self-defense exception to the general
prohibition against warfare. This view emphasizes the overriding influence
of Article 2(4) and recognizes the potential for abuse of Article 51 if self-
defense justifications are accepted too readily.55 An overly expansive
interpretation of "armed attack" would provide a ready excuse to any state
seeking to attack another. As long as the aggressor state could vaguely
characterize its action as a pre-emptive strike in self-defense against some
possible future threat posed by the other state, Article 51 would justify the
aggression.-6
The expansive view holds that a literal interpretation of "armed attack"
places undue constraints on a state's ability to respond legitimately to
international aggression.5 ' The expansivists point out that under a truly
literal construction of Article 51, pre-emptive actions against even a clearly
imminent attack are not permitted. Thus, a state adopting a purely
restrictive view of Article 51 may be faced with the absurd situation of
having to watch a squadron of enemy bombers reaching striking distance to
launch cruise missiles, unable to act until the last minute when the aircraft
actually enters its airspace.
The expansive view argues that the restrictivists fail to appreciate the
serious problems posed to civilized nations by low-intensity warfare. 59 As
the expansivists explain, it is no longer necessary to attack with scores of
tanks in order to inflict grave injury on a foreign state. These scholars point
" The two interpretations of "armed attack" are discussed fully by Feder, supra note 46,
at 402-12.
Md at 404.
55 Id. at 404-05.
56 For example, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam suggested that the
mining of Nicaragua's harbors in 1984 could be justified by characterizing it as "an act of
collective self-defense," presumably on the theory that if Soviet influence were allowed to
develop in Nicaragua, the Soviet Union would gain a "foothold" in Central America, which
could eventually threaten the neighboring United States. Bernard Gwertzman, House Group
Joins in Opposing Mining Nicaraguan Ports, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1984, at Al. This theory,
while plausible, is difficult to reconcile with Article 51's requirement of an "armed attack,"
no matter how expansive an interpretation is given to the phrase.
" See Coil, supra note 50, at 116-18.
5' Feder, supra note 46, at 408.
Coil, supra note 50, at 111-14.
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to the recent rise in terrorist activity and the need for nations to defend
against this threat without having to wait for a terrorist group to detonate a
bomb in the rotunda of their capitol building.60
The restrictivist viewpoint has prevailed during the past decades and is
supported by the majority of the U.N. Security Council.6 However, the
United States leads the minority of states who have argued for a more
expansive interpretation of Article 5 1.62 This dispute has been the source
of a great deal of friction between the United States and the international
community, reflected in the controversy over the Libya raid. The restrictivist
international majority has, until now, been steadfast in its opposition to the
expansivist arguments of the United States.
IV. ANALYSIS
The similarities between the 1986 attack on Libya and the 1993 attack on
Iraq are striking. Both were carefully calculated airstrikes targeting military
or paramilitary facilities which supported terrorist activities that threatened
the lives of American citizens.63 Both were conducted at night with
relatively little collateral damage and few civilian casualties." Both were
attempts to thwart the audacity of a particularly belligerent leader of a third
world state.65  Most importantly, in both instances the United States
60 Professor Coll notes, "There are situations besides the defense of U.S. territory and
American lives in which force should be used, either directly or indirectly. The [U.N.]
[C]harter's prohibitions on the use of force in international relations should be read as a
proscription on aggressive force, not as a ban on the right of free societies to defend their
interest and way of life against the complex modalities of violent peace." Id. at 116.
61 Feder, supra note 46, at 414.
6' The mining of Nicaragua's harbor in 1984, the Libya bombing raid in 1986, and the
invasion of Panama in 1989 are all examples of the United States justifying the use of
military force by relying on an expansive interpretation of Article 51. John Quigley, The
Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 276, 287-92 (1990).
6 Former-President Bush was the specific target of the Iraqi assassination plot, but many
Americans in Bush's entourage almost certainly would have been killed if the bomb had
detonated. The 176 lb. bomb had the capacity to level a large area of Kuwait City, killing
hundreds of people. Preston, supra note 20, at A12.
64 Although some 45-100 civilians were killed in the 1986 Libya raid, this fact was
seldom cited as a reason behind the international community's condemnation of the raid.
(' It is difficult to argue that the international community condoned the Iraq strike simply
because of its animosity for Saddam Hussein. Although the majority of nations harbor a
strong dislike for Hussein, Mu'ammar Qaddafi was certainly no less reviled by the world in
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justified the legality of its use of force by relying on Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.66
Accordingly, the international community's response to the 1993 strike is
surprising since it differed so drastically from its response to the 1986
bombing raid. In stark contrast to the quiet acceptance of 1993, a majority
of countries, including many of the United States' allies, responded to the
raid on Libya with words of indignation and condemnation. Most signifi-
cantly, the majority of states openly and specifically criticized the United
States for violating international law.
The strongly negative response to the raid on Libya reflects the traditional
restrictive view of Article 51: At the time of the U.S. bombing raid, Libya
was not engaged in a current, ongoing "armed attack" against the United
States,67 and consequently the U.S. actions could not properly be called
1986 after his terrorist attacks on innocent women and children, and yet the international
community condemned the 1986 Libya raid.
" In his letter to Congress, President Clinton explained the legal justification for the Iraq
strike:
Consequently, in the exercise of our inherent right of self-defense as
recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and pursuant to
my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations
and as commander in chief, I ordered [the strike against Iraq].
Letter from President Clinton to Congress (June 28, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File.
President Reagan's letter to Congress declared, in similar fashion, "These strikes [against
Libya] were conducted in the exercise of our right to self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter." Letter from President Reagan to Congress (Apr. 16, 1986), DEP'T
ST. BuLL., June 1986, at 8. In his address to the American people, Reagan again stated,
"Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission
undertaken tonight-a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."
President's Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), DEP'T OF ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1.
67 An expansivist would dispute this point, arguing that while Libya may not have been
actually attacking the United States at the time of the April bombing raid, the recurring past
terrorist acts committed by Libya constituted a pattern of continuing international aggression
against the United States that justified Article 51 measures. The expansivist would accuse
the restrictivist of focusing too narrowly on the "lull between battles" rather than on the
continuing "war" between Libya and the United States. The Security Council rejected similar
arguments made by Israel throughout the period of 1968 to 1978 to justify its forceful and
militant response to P.L.O. terrorist activities. Feder, supra note 46, at 414-18. This
argument, known as the "accumulation of events" theory or the Nadelstichtaktik (needle prick)
doctrine, is summarized by Feder: "According to this doctrine of international law .... each
specific act of terrorism, or needle prick, may not qualify as an armed attack that entitles the
victim state to respond legitimately with armed force. But the totality of the incidents may
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"self-defense." The restrictivists' fear that states will abuse an expansive
interpretation of Article 51 for their own illegitimate ends is clearly reflected
in China's statement condemning "encroachment upon the territory of a
sovereign state under the pretext of striking terrorism.""
In contrast, the reaction to the 1993 airstrike on Iraq reflects a strongly
expansive view of Article 51. Iraq was not involved in a current, ongoing
attack against the United States at the time of the cruise missile strike, nor
had it exhibited any threat of imminent attack. In fact, the incident which
the United States claimed to be the "armed attack" justifying Article 51
measures, the assassination attempt on former-President Bush, was never
carried to fruition." Nevertheless, the international community acquiesced
in Ambassador Albright's characterization of the Iraqi plot as an "attack."'
These two different reactions from the members of the international
community reflect a clear shift in interpretation of Article 51 from a
restrictive view to a more expansive view. The meaning of "armed attack"
has apparently evolved during the last decade, and the world now seems to
be on the verge of legalizing the sort of international use of force which
heretofore has been prohibited.
Admittedly, the international community's acceptance of the 1993 raid on
Iraq can hardly be characterized as a thundering approval for an altogether
new and widely expanded view of Article 51. The majority of states have
allowed the United States to justify its actions by relying on Article 51, but
underlying murmurs of objection are still being voiced by dissenting
elements in those governments and by international legal scholars.7
Obviously, a total rejection of the restrictivist view of "armed attack" in
demonstrate a systematic campaign of minor terrorist activities that does rise to the intolerable
level of armed attack." Id at 415.
" See Israelis Praise, supra note 33, at A9.
69 A restrictivist would argue that allowing an attempted, but subsequently frustrated,
attack to justify Article 51 response measures would be to hopelessly blur the meaning of
armed attack to the point of rendering the phrase meaningless.
70 During the June 27, 1993 Security Council meeting, Ambassador Albright stated, "[Iln
our judgment, every member here today would regard an assassination attempt against its
former head of state as an attack against itself, and would react." Albright, supra note 20.
71 See, e.g., Simon Jenkins, Hollywood Morality Gone Mad, TIMES (LONDON), June 30,
1993, at 18; Michael Ratner and Jules Lobel, Bombing Baghdad, Revisited; Lawful Self-
Defense or Unlawful Reprisal?, CONN. L. TRIB., July 19, 1993, at 24; John Roberts, Iraq:
Moral and Legal Reasons Behind Attack Under Question, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 28,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, INPRES File.
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favor of a widely expansive one has not yet been made.
However, the quiet and somewhat subdued approval of the 1993 Iraq
strike exhibited by the international community is nonetheless highly
significant when viewed in the context of prior attempts by the United States
to justify its use of armed intervention on grounds of self-defense. In the
past, such attempts have been overwhelmingly rejected. The 1986 raid on
Libya, while most closely paralleling the circumstances of the 1993 airstrike
on Iraq, is only one of several incidents in which the international communi-
ty has charged the United States with violating international law through
military intervention in a foreign state under a false claim of self-defense.
The 1989 invasion of Panama also exemplifies the United States' use of
limited military force against an alleged threat to American nationals and its
reliance on Article 51 for justification of that use of force. 2 After the
invasion of Panama, many members of the international community rejected
the validity of the Article 51 defense and criticized the United States for
violating international law."'
2 In 1989, President Bush responded to the murder of an American military officer and
the abuse of another officer and his wife in Panama by commencing "Operation Just Cause,"
the United States military intervention in Panama to oust the allegedly corrupt Panamanian
leader, Manuel Noriega. For a summary of the events leading to the invasion and President
Bush's subsequent justification of the invasion, see U.S. Forces Invade Panama, Seize Wide
Control; Noriega Eludes Capture, 1989 FAcrs ON FILE 941 [hereinafter U.S. Forces Invade
Panama]. The Bush Administration justified the incursion by alleging that the Panamanian
Defense Force constituted a threat to the Americans living in the Canal Zone, and specifically
relied on Article 51 as giving the United States the right to intervene. Id. at 942. The United
States also relied on Article 21 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, which
prohibits members from resorting to military force except in self-defense, and Article 4 of the
1979 treaty covering the neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal. Susan F. Rasky,
Fighting in Panama: Legal Case; Administration Says International Agreements Support Its
Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A22.
"The international community largely rejected the United States' interpretation of Article
51. On December 22, 1989, the Organization of American States voted 20 to 1 to adopt a
resolution "deeply deploring" the U.S. intervention and calling for the withdrawal of U.S.
troops. Noriega Seeks Refuge with Papal Envoy in Panama, 1989 FACTS ON FILEs 961, 961.
On December 29, the U.N. General Assembly voted 75 to 20 in favor of a resolution that
"strongly deplored" the invasion as a "flagrant violation of international law." Id. A U.N.
Security Council resolution condemning the invasion was blocked on December 23 by vetoes
from the United States, Great Britain, and France. Id. Other nations criticizing the U.S.
intervention in Panama included: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, the Soviet Union, and Venezuela. U.S. Forces Invade Panama, supra note
72, at 942-943.
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Importantly, the circumstances of the Panama invasion were markedly
different from those of the 1986 Libya raid and the 1993 Iraq airstrike, 4
and accordingly, the conclusions which can be drawn from the comparison
are limited. However, the harsh criticism which the United States faced after
the Panama invasion reflects the strong reluctance of the international
community to accept an Article 51 justification for the use of military force
by the United States. 5 Thus, while the international support for the 1993
Iraq airstrike has not been a resounding thunder of approval, the existence
of a notable measure of support is indeed remarkable in light of the
international community's past history of rejecting Article 51 justifications
by the United States.
The shift away from a restrictivist interpretation of Article 51 becomes
even more pronounced when the legal justification for the 1993 airstrike on
Iraq is considered. The legal justification for the Iraq strike is probably
much weaker than it was for the 1986 bombing raid, as revealed by
examining the minor variations in the circumstances of the two raids.
First, the terrorist activities which led to the 1986 Libya raid resulted in
over fifty American casualties (including two deaths), 6 while the 1993
assassination plot was discovered before any life was harmed or lost.
Secondly, in 1986, the Libyan government expressed its clear intention to
launch future terrorist attacks against American nationals." In contrast, the
United States found no conclusive evidence that Iraq intended to attempt
4 The objective of the invasion of Panama was the removal of Noriega, the generalissimo
President of the nation who served as a key link in the illegal drug trafficking chain from the
South American drug cartels to the United States. Id. at 942. In contrast, the strikes against
Iraq and Libya were motivated by those nations' alleged terrorist activities.
" For criticisms from legal scholars of the invasion of Panama as a violation of
international law, see Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 503 (1990); Quigley, supra note 62.
76 See U.S. Presses Allies on Libya, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
" d. at 209-10. During the period of 1984-1986, Libyan president Mu'ammar Qaddafi
on numerous occasions expressed his intent to harm U.S. citizens. In a June 1984 speech,
he announced to a Libyan audience that "we are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart
of America." Text of the State Department Report In Libya Under Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1986, at A6. During the previous September, he declared, "[W]e have the right to fight
America, and we have the right to export terrorism to them." Id. In a January 1986 press
conference, Qaddafi threatened to "pursue U.S. citizens in their country and streets" if the
United States took action in response to Libya's involvement in the Rome and Vienna terrorist
attacks. Id.
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future assassinations against American officials.78 Thus, the Iraq airstrike
was less conclusively a self-defensive pre-emptive strike than was the Libya
raid.79 Finally, the United States made a good faith effort to use diplomatic
coercion to dissuade Libya from continuing its terrorist activities.' Again
in contrast, the United States resorted to military force against Iraq almost
as soon as the evidence of the assassination plot was confirmed, without any
attempt to use diplomatic channels to punish Iraq.
Importantly, it is not entirely clear that Article 51 does authorize the use
of force in response to an attempted but subsequently frustrated assassination
plot. International law authorities point out that the attack on Iraq is best
characterized as a "reprisal" and not as a pre-emptive strike against an
imminent attack, and thus is less arguably a proper case of self-defense."'
Whether the airstrike on Iraq was legal in the minds of international law
scholars is largely irrelevant, however, since international law is decided and
formulated by the conduct of nations and not within the ivied halls of
academia. In other words, the question of whether scholars believe that the
raid was legal is not nearly as important as whether the governments of the
world believe that it was legal. Thus, while there are perhaps strong
arguments questioning the legality of the Iraq strike, the interesting
development is that in spite of these arguments, the international community
is apparently beginning to accept a broadened application of Article 51 as
legal justification for the use of force.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This apparent shift toward a broadened interpretation of Article 51 carries
serious implications for the future of international relations. The restrictive
7' Jenkins, supra note 71, at 18.
Ratner & Lobel, supra note 71, at 24.
'o After Libyan-sponsored terrorists bombed the Rome and Vienna airports, President
Reagan severed economic ties between the United States and Libya in an attempt to coerce
Libya into ceasing its support of terrorism. The United States urged other nations to join in
an economic embargo against Libya, but only Canada participated in the embargo. Western
European countries rejected the idea of an embargo, fearing retaliation against their citizens
or doubting the ability of sanctions to deter Qaddafi. The list of these countries includes
Britain, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Norway and Japan. Intoccia, supra note 28, at
182-86.
" For criticism of the legality of the Iraq airstrike, see Ratner & Lobel, supra note 71;
Jenkins, supra note 71.
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view of Article 51 has already been stretched by the United States82 and
Israel. 3 Furthermore, if the legal constraints heretofore imposed by the
restrictivists are relaxed, it is impossible to predict what actions nations may
take against the continuing threats posed by low-intensity warfare. There is
certainly no shortage of targets from which to choose, considering the many
threats facing civilized nations today, including terrorism, assassinations,
illegal drug trafficking, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and regional
instability.
However, a broadened interpretation of Article 51 should not be con-
demned simply because it gives more power to nations who have the
potential to abuse that power. The threat posed by low-intensity warfare is
certainly legitimate and is a formidable menace that must recognized. At
some point, the danger to international stability created by radical leaders,
such as Hussein and Qaddafi, who are permitted to go unpunished exceeds
the danger posed by the potential for nations to abuse an expanded
interpretation of Article 51 for their own illegitimate ends.
Ultimately, the final judgment of whether this new shift in international
law will have a positive effect on world stability may only be revealed in the
approaching years after nations have had a chance to test the limits of this
expanded power which has very subtly been granted to them. With great
power has always come great responsibility, and this old adage is particularly
true in the modern world where nations wield truly awesome military and
paramilitary forces against each other.
There is a great opportunity here for the civilized nations of the world to
use a broadened interpretation of Article 51 to combat and defeat the forces
of terrorism in all of its insidious forms. There is also a great potential for
nations to abuse this power by using military force against others in
contrived claims of pre-emptive self-defense. Whether future legal historians
will remember the 1993 Iraq airstrike crisis as the moment when the world
decided to take a stand against terrorism, or as the moment when internation-
al law fatally loosened its grip on the wild forces of international instability,
will be determined in the years to come.
Stuart G. Baker
82 See supra note 62.
83 The U.N. Security Council has issued I I resolutions condemning Israel's use of force
against Lebanon, rejecting Israel's Article 51 arguments. Feder, supra note 46, at 414.
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